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Considering the complications of collecting empirical data on community 
participation, this study proposes a new methodological approach that departs 
from the current literature. For the first time, an experimental procedure is adopted 
to conduct a direct comparison between participatory and non-participatory 
decision-making in the context of heritage tourism planning. Contrary to previous 
work, this is the first ex-ante assessment of community participation at a 
destination with no such prior experience. The analysis relies on behavioural data 
on choices, deliberation, and conflict studied in the context of a controlled 
collaborative environment. The findings suggest that choices and deliberation 
between participatory and non-participatory groups exhibit no statistically 
significant differences although participatory groups were more susceptible to 
conflict. However, interestingly, conflict was constructive as it increased provisions 
for heritage goods. Furthermore, intra-group heterogeneity did not always affect 
collective decisions negatively whereas trust and institutional credibility played a 
major role in influencing both individual and collective preferences. These findings 
have important implications for research and policy, opening a novel avenue for 
the systematic study of participation dynamics to inform the instigation of 
participatory endeavours. 
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Introduction 
The concept of community participation was introduced to tourism studies more than three 
decades ago (Murphy, 1985), yet it remains topical in sustainable tourism research. Relevant 
scholarly work acknowledges community actors, such as destination residents and local 
business owners, as stakeholders who deserve to participate not only in tourism trade but also 
in the planning and decision-making for tourism development (Cohen-Hattab, 2013; Reggers 
et al., 2016; Saufi et al., 2014). The advocates of participatory governance suggest that such 
approach can increase trust and public consensus, lead to tourism strategies that correspond 
to local needs and contribute to destination sustainability (Byrd et al., 2009; Currie et al., 2009; 
Ooi et al., 2015). 
Community participation is also emphasised in the context of heritage management and by 
extension, heritage tourism planning (Den, 2014; Oevermann et al., 2016; Su & Wall, 2014). 
Heritage management theorists propose the involvement of the public in decision-making as 
a means of accommodating community-relevant values and interests, protecting cultural 
diversity, and promoting viable solutions that balance conservation and competing pressures 
from socio-economic activity (Landorf, 2009; Pacifico & Vogel, 2012). Likewise, world-leading 
organisations, such as UNESCO (2012), propose a heritage tourism paradigm where 
destination hosts are involved in the ‘dialogue’ of policy-shaping so that sustainability can be 
pursued through synergies between experts and communities (Waterton & Smith, 2010).  
Despite growing consensus over community participation, top-down non-participatory 
approaches to decision-making still prevail in heritage tourism planning, where decisions are 
made exclusively by traditional ‘power-holders’, such as state elected and appointed officials 
(Su & Wall, 2014; Su et al., 2016). At the same time, destinations that embark on collaborative 
projects focus on establishing formal partnerships with major government and non-
government institutions, rather than with informal groups of citizens (Landorf, 2009). Apart 
from few exemptions, efforts to engage with the broader public have not yielded meaningful 
results while creating several procedural difficulties that make the whole participation affair 
unpleasant for both policymakers and heritage managers (Izdiak et al., 2015). The most 
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commonly reported barriers are time and monetary costs, unwillingness to share power, 
problems in reaching consensus and distrust in the quality of collective decisions (Irvin & 
Stansbury, 2004; Jordan et al., 2013; Marzuki et al., 2012). Consequently, citizen input tends 
to be marginalised and largely confined to informing and consultation, reflecting a type of 
‘minimal’ involvement, where participants have little power to influence policy drastically 
(Marzuki et al., 2012; Spencer, 2010).  
Existing literature provides some empirical insights based on ex-post assessments of 
participatory endeavours by employing primarily qualitative survey tools, such as interviews 
and focus groups (see inter alia Aas et al., 2005; Beaumont & Dredge, 2010; Byrd, 2007; 
Jordan et al., 2013; Nyaupane et al., 2006; Spencer, 2010; Wray, 2011). Nevertheless, the 
limited naturally occurring data make it difficult to observe the impact of community-inclusive 
decision-making in heritage tourism or compare and analyse the process of participatory 
governance with counterfactuals in destinations with no prior experience of pluralist 
approaches to planning. Admittedly, current scarcity of hands-on experiences in participatory 
decision-making and its resulting gap between theoretical discourses and empirical data act 
unfavourably to convincingly persuade policymakers to tackle the political, socio-cultural and 
practical complexities of pursuing the democratization of tourism planning (Lovan et al., 2017). 
Thus, more research is required into the feasibility and outcomes of participation to provide 
further evidence that the concept is not ‘idealistic’ but rather worthy of implementation.  
To address these issues, the paper adopts a novel approach inspired by experimental 
economics in order to further our knowledge of community involvement in heritage tourism 
decision-making. In particular, we employ a quasi-field economic experiment to conduct, for 
the first time, an ex-ante evaluation of community participation by directly comparing its 
performance with non-participatory planning. The study field is Kastoria, an emerging rural 
destination in Greece that is challenged by economic restructuring and heritage vulnerability. 
Our methodology allows us to explore deliberation, conflict and investment outcomes of 
government-led, grass-roots, and mixed participatory groups consisting of both state officials 
and citizens. To do so, we expose subjects to collective decision-making during an 
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endowment allocation task with the view to reveal behaviour and the interplay of different 
interests under realistic circumstances. We further explore conflict by examining group 
negotiations, comparing individual preferences with collective choices, and considering the 
effects of intra-group heterogeneity. This methodological approach opens a new avenue into 
exploring participatory dynamics and processes that bear important policy implications for the 
instigation and viability of citizen involvement in sustainable tourism planning. 
Therefore, this article makes three key contributions. Firstly, it introduces the use of 
experimental protocols similar to that of public goods for studying otherwise difficult to capture 
phenomena, such as collective decision-making and negotiation in a controlled social 
environment, appropriate for juxtaposing alternative governance structures and 
counterfactuals. Secondly, it explores how non-expert social actors perform in a joint decision-
making context either autonomously or in collaboration with state officials, when assigned with 
real power over investment choices. Finally, it examines important elements of collaborative 
planning, such as conflict, trust, and their impact on decisions, in a destination with no previous 
participatory experiences.   
 
Participatory planning for heritage tourism: theory and hypotheses 
Heritage tourism is special-interest tourism driven by visitor engagement with elements of the 
past, such as archaeological sites, local architecture, folk arts, crafts, and traditions that 
witness the cultural legacy of destinations (Timothy & Boyd, 2006). The ‘heritagisation’ of 
tourism experiences is increasingly recognised as a means of enhancing destination 
attractiveness, especially in rural areas, while providing incentives for conservation 
(Antonakakis et al., 2015; Bessiere, 2013; Dragouni & Fouseki, 2017). Nonetheless, the 
sustainable development of heritage tourism destinations does not merely require substantial 
investment but also necessitates host community consent for its strategic direction. Especially 
in the heritage field, achieving a balance between economic growth, socio-cultural vitality and 
heritage viability presents additional complexity, since the conservation of the past is often 
seen as antagonistic to contemporary community needs (Aas et al., 2005; Landorf, 2009; 
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Lowenthal, 2015; Pacifico & Vogel, 2012). Therefore, a key principle for sustainable heritage 
tourism is the active involvement of multiple stakeholders in its planning, such as citizens and 
community groups that (re)produce heritage and interact with it (Cohen-Hatttab, 2013; Marzuki 
et al., 2012; Reggers et al., 2016; Salazar, 2012). As it is widely held in the literature, the 
participation of these stakeholders in the development of heritage tourism is vital for achieving 
equitability, compromising divergent interests, devising legitimate policies, improving heritage 
interpretation, enhancing visitor experiences, and maintaining long-term commitment to 
sustainability goals (see inter alia Byrd et al., 2009; Chirikure et al., 2010; Currie et al., 2009; 
Nunkoo & Ramkissoon, 2011; Oevermann et al., 2016; Okazaki, 2008; Ooi et al., 2015; 
Pacifico & Vogel, 2012; Reid, 2003). In this light, community participation can be described as 
a pluralist power structure (Jordan et al., 2013) or more dynamically, as a process of 
empowerment of the broader public through its inclusion in decision-making. 
Despite the widespread theoretical consensus for community participation in tourism 
strategies, in practice, destination hosts have seldom genuine control over relevant decisions 
(Jordan et al., 2013; Su et al., 2016; Su & Wall, 2014). Rather, community input is mostly 
confined to public consultation with limited impact on the actual shaping of policies (Marzuki 
et al., 2012; Spencer, 2010). Traditional ‘power-holders’, such as government agents and 
appointed officials, are accustomed to expert-led planning and resist sharing their power with 
less formal stakeholders (Jordan et al., 2013; Landorf, 2009). At the same time, heritage 
professionals, who hold authority over the management of antiquities and other resources that 
shape the cultural fabric of destinations, are often reluctant to interact on terms of parity with 
non-experts in heritage matters (Waterton & Smith, 2010).  
While scholars have proposed compelling participatory models (e.g. Kimbu & Nhoasong, 
2013; Oevermann et al., 2016; Okazaki, 2008), and have used case-study research to assess 
how citizen participation might work in a particular context (see, for instance, Aas et al., 2005; 
Beaumont & Dredge, 2010; Byrd, 2007; Izdiak et al., 2015; Jordan et al., 2013; Marzuki et al., 
2012; Nyaupane et al., 2006; Spencer, 2010; Wray, 2011), we still have fragmentary evidence 
on the effectiveness of community involvement and its impact on decision-making when 
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citizens are assigned with direct power to influence policy. Since natural observations of 
participation occur rather infrequently in the planning field, ex-post analyses are limited while 
there is a research gap in exploring destinations prior to promoting participatory processes, 
as a means to inform their instigation in destinations which are unfamiliar with the process and 
where there is low pre-existing agency of non-expert communities. This is vital as despite the 
inherent qualities and ideals of a democratic planning system, pursuing participation as an 
end in itself might not be convincing as a standalone position considering the barriers and 
costs involved. Moreover, it is suggested that in the eyes of policymakers, a failed participatory 
attempt is worse than none, leading to avoidance of community involvement (Lovan et al., 
2017). Thus, more evidence would be valuable for increasing our knowledge of the process 
and outcomes of host community participation at Arnstein’s (1969) citizen power levels.  
Based on the literature, moving beyond mere consultation to pluralist structures of decision-
making can be particularly complex. First and foremost, the participation of more interest 
groups in the shaping of tourism development is likely to tone up the expression of opposing 
policy preferences (Ebdon & Franklin, 2008; Ostrom, 1990). As it is suggested, disparity and 
often incompatibility of concerns across stakeholders can complicate collaboration and 
decrease effectiveness (Byrd et al., 2009; Izdiak et al., 2015; Waligo et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, trust issues are extremely relevant at higher levels of participation, given that 
tourism development policies feature capital investment decisions that need to be reached 
collaboratively (Jordan et al., 2013). From this standpoint, the credibility of community 
becomes essential and needs to be further established as power distribution necessitates trust 
on behalf of both state and civic stakeholders (Kimbu & Ngoasong, 2013; Nunkoo et al., 2012; 
Nunkoo & Gursoy, 2016; Nunkoo & Ramkissoon, 2012).  
Moreover, heritage goods can be seen as liabilities in the eyes of non-expert communities 
as they pose and receive pressures from competing economic activities (Chirikure et al., 
2010). Especially in emergent destinations, where heritage tourism benefits have not been felt 
yet, policy and resource allocation preferences of non-expert citizens may depart from expert 
opinions and thus, planning decisions may end up having counter-effects on heritage 
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sustainability. Moreover, although theoretically, participation is believed to form a step towards 
a more equitable share of tourism benefits, it is feared that the practical application of 
community-inclusiveness could serve as an opportunity to ratify decisions in favour of the 
personal gains of its most persuasive and powerful participants (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). 
These concerns imply an inherent ‘risk’ in participatory planning, as to whether decisions 
reached collaboratively would be more effective in promoting commonly-beneficial and 
sustainable heritage tourism action.  
Based on this premise, it is interesting to explore whether decisions made by participatory 
groups with wider stakeholder representation (e.g. non-exert residents) lead to less ‘pro-
heritage’ investment decisions as compared to conventional top-down decision-making, 
where investment choices are made exclusively by state officials and appointed heritage 
experts. Thus, our first hypothesis (H1) is formulated as follows: 
 
H1. Participatory decision-making leads to lower pro-heritage investments compared to non-
participatory investment choices.  
 
As implied earlier, commonly-reported obstacles in pursuing participation are difficulties in 
reaching consensus, lengthy decision-making times, and the existence of multiple and often 
incompatible interests (Byrd et al., 2009; Izdiak et al., 2015; Marzuki et al., 2012). In particular, 
it is maintained that longer deliberation exposes decision-making to diverse values that may 
exist across a community and that contested opinions give rise to conflict (Lo et al., 2013). 
Although the essence of participation is the opportunity of social actors and local agents to 
communicate and reach a compromise, conflict is generally regarded as a destructive force in 
decision-making (Byrd et al., 2009; Marzuki et al., 2012). Based on these narratives, it would 
be interesting to explore the degree to which community involvement entails a trade-off 
between inclusiveness and efficiency by testing the performance of participatory against non-
participatory groups within the same context. Having more evidence on this issue or knowing 
what to expect would be valuable as extensive decision-making procedures or failure to co-
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operate during conflictual deliberation can be particularly costly. This leads us to our second 
hypothesis (H2): 
 
H2. Participatory decision-making is less effective that non-participatory decision-making, in 
terms of being more time-consuming and conflictual.  
 
In addition, given that divergent interests are normally treated as problematic when it comes 
to decision-making, governance effectiveness and participants’ heterogeneity are believed to 
be negatively correlated (Ostrom, 1990). This implies that the interests of traditional power-
holders may differ considerably from citizen drivers whereas a disparity of beliefs across 
participants could complicate collaborations considerably (Byrd et al., 2009; Jordan et al., 
2013; Waligo et al., 2013). Particularly in heritage tourism, dissimilarity of perceptions and 
preferences are further perplexed as both what is collectively valued as heritage and how 
heritage is collectively valued presuppose shared judgements on its importance and potential 
for tourism development (Bessiere, 2013). Furthermore, policy choices can be heavily affected 
by perceptions of trust and shared agreement over participants’ credibility (Lo et al., 2013; 
Nunkoo, 2015; Nunkoo & Ramkissoon, 2012). Thus, consistency of the internal and external 
legitimacy of the parties involved have a central role in tourism partnerships (Beaumont & 
Dredge, 2010). In turn, incompatibility between valuations of heritage or between participants’ 
subjective judgments are parameters that deserve attention. Gaining a better understanding 
of the influence of these factors on heritage tourism decisions, and more critically, 
investigating the degree to which ideological disparity impacts on co-operation can offer 
additional insight into the dynamics of decision-making. Therefore, our third testable 
hypothesis (H3) is the following: 	
 
H3. Group heterogeneity exerts significant negative influences on heritage tourism investment 
decisions.  
 
		
9	
Although testing these hypotheses is interesting for informing planning policy, the limited 
natural data on participatory projects renders it particularly difficult to observe the effects of 
community involvement in heritage tourism planning or assess the counterfactuals of 
participatory decision-making at a practical level. Existing empirical work engages in case-
study enquiries of participatory processes and outcomes in destinations where some form of 
community involvement has been pursued (see inter alia Aas et al., 2005; Beaumont & 
Dredge, 2010; Byrd, 2007; Jamal and McDonald, 2011; Reggers et al., 2016; Spencer, 2010; 
Waligo et al., 2013). Most commonly, these studies employ survey tools such as interviews, 
focus groups or ethnographic approaches. Although these methods are valuable for ex-post 
assessments of collaborative planning, they do not allow for a direct comparison between 
participatory processes to counterfactuals, or the testing of whether and how participatory 
governance arrangements could work in destinations that have not yet embarked on 
collaborative projects. 
Contrary to previous work, this study focuses its attention on an ex-ante comparative 
evaluation across different decision-making structures for heritage tourism planning in order 
to explore its hypotheses. For the first time, an experimental approach is adopted, designed 
to elicit the micro-level dynamics of collaborative policy decisions across government-led, 
citizen-led and participatory mixed groups, in a controlled way. Based on our design, 
government-led non-participatory groups reflect conventional planning, where decisions are 
made exclusively by government authorities and state appointed heritage professionals. At 
the same time, citizen-led groups comprising local residents, community associations and 
business owners reflect grass-roots decision-making. Most crucially, groups of mixed 
composition (i.e. both state- and citizen-inclusive) represent a participatory pluralist structure 
of decision-making. Such experimental examination facilitates the identification and 
comparative analysis of community involvement impacts on tourism planning as opposed to 
non-inclusive planning procedures, by ‘simulating’ a collaborative environment prior to an 
actual participatory venture.  
The next sections provide a detailed account of our methodological framework and findings. 
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Methodology 
Conceptual framework 
The distinction of experimental research as opposed to other methodological approaches, 
such as observational tools, is the random assignment of human subjects to various conditions 
(i.e. treatments) and the comparison of their behaviour against control or other treatments 
(Druckman et al., 2011). Hence, the experimental approach renders it possible to observe 
stakeholders’ behaviour and test the efficiency of participatory planning in any destination by 
staging policy-making procedures and exposing communities to them. Economic experiments 
are well-established tools for examining social behaviour and exploring policy issues (Croson, 
2002; Exadaktylos et al., 2013). Our enquiry adopts and adapts their mechanics with the view 
to extend their scope to the challenging topic of participatory tourism. 
Our theoretical premise for applying an experimental methodology to the context of 
participatory heritage tourism planning is on the one hand, the public good qualities of heritage 
and on the other, the relevance of social preferences to policy investment decisions. As 
heritage bears the non-excludable and non-rival features of public goods, heritage assets are 
defined as public or quasi-public goods (Navrud & Ready, 2002), as even in cases where 
access to them is restricted (e.g. listed buildings used as private residencies) or conditional 
(i.e. admission charges) there are still consumption elements that cannot be controlled, such 
as aesthetic pleasure.  
Public heritage goods can be enjoyed by all society and provide communal and tourism 
benefits. Investments in such goods affect positively anyone that uses them in the present or 
future. Thus, the public good nature of heritage resources suggests that any contribution to 
their preservation or promotion is independent from their consumption (Ostrom, 1990). 
Especially in tourism development, public investments in heritage could create communal 
benefits, however the most ‘visible’ gains may be enjoyed by visitors and tourism 
stakeholders. For those not involved in tourism trade, the benefits could seem too indirect 
(e.g. economic gains from the injection of tourism income into the local economy) or too 
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intangible (e.g. scientific value or sense of identity and pride), particularly at initial stages of 
tourism growth. 
According to economic theory, the separation between investments and returns creates 
social dilemmas, where non-cooperative behaviour for the provision of heritage goods is 
seemingly the best course of action, promising the highest individual gains, which are 
nonetheless subject to others’ altruism or ephemeral non-cooperation. The temptation to free-
ride or to refuse provisions on the basis on no personal consumption can eventually minimise 
collective benefits and lead to heritage degradation or depletion, leaving everyone worse-off. 
Thus, a key condition to resolve social dilemmas and safeguard sustainability is participants’ 
willingness to contribute to collective benefits (Ostrom, 1990). 
We hold that such dilemmas are highly relevant to the context of participatory heritage 
tourism planning in the context of sustainable development. The expansion of heritage tourism 
requires substantial financial (public) investments and the support of both policymakers and 
destination hosts for its long-term viability. Community participation in this context would 
assign to citizens the power to negotiate with traditional stakeholders and jointly decide on 
how to allocate their available resources (Arnstein, 1969). In today’s fiscal stress and 
especially in destinations that suffer from economic depression, such enquiry is critical given 
the opportunity costs of conserving the past and pursuing small-scale sustainable tourism 
activity (Lowenthal, 2015; Redclift, 2005).  
 
Study context 
Even though the vast majority of economic experiments are laboratory-based (Exadaktylos et 
al., 2013), there are several examples of experiments conducted in a natural field (see for 
instance Cardenas, 2004; Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004; Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). Similar 
to the latter, this study applies a quasi-field experimental methodology to a real destination. 
The quasi-field design allows for maintaining some control over subjects’ exposure to 
treatments, which is necessary for testing participatory against non-participatory behaviour by 
controlling experimental groups’ composition (i.e. distinguishing subjects based on their 
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capacity as state agents and non-state agents, such as residents). Following the case-study 
approach, our enquiry employs a destination which was unfamiliar with participatory policy at 
the time of the study and where the development of heritage tourism was highly relevant for 
stimulating tourism-led growth while increasing incentives for heritage protection.  
More specifically, the context of our study is Kastoria, a peripheral area in the northern 
peninsular mainland of Greece. Kastoria fitted well with our criteria as it had a heavily 
depressed economy, reflected by its 30.8% unemployment rate (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 
2016), and a rich but fragile heritage capital, manifested by the inclusion of its historic centre 
in Europa Nostra’s list of the ‘7 Most Endangered Heritage Sites in Europe’ (de Leon, 2015). 
As a destination, Kastoria had a relatively small tourism sector of approximately 2,000-bed 
capacity, which was peripheral to its economy (Hellenic Chamber of Hotels, 2016). Following 
the prevailing model of mass-organised non-specialised tourism in Greece, Kastoria 
developed a standardised tourism offer, which was mainly consumed domestically. However, 
as recent years witnessed a decline of its local manufacturing and a national on-going 
economic crisis, opportunities emerged for developing its tourism further. Considering 
Greece’s homogeneity and shortfall in special interest tourism (Tsartas et al., 2014), Kastoria 
could develop differentiated heritage tourism experiences to increase its attractiveness and 
competitiveness. Based on its diverse heritage collection of prehistoric, classical, medieval 
and modern sites of interest, it could capitalise on heritage tourism to stimulate its rural 
economy and encourage investment in its local heritage fabric.  
Nevertheless, investing in heritage is costly, whereas opportunity costs, coupled with the 
economic predicament of the region during the study period, rendered the issue of sharing 
decision-making control with multiple non-expert stakeholders even more dubious. In terms of 
prior knowledge, the local community had no formal experience of collaborative decision-
making. The Archaeological Service and its local branches had been traditionally the leading 
agents for the formulation and execution of heritage planning, often in collaboration with other 
government authorities (e.g. city councils) but autonomously from non-governmental bodies 
and the wider public. Overall, considering its economic structure, heritage stature and policy 
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culture, Kastoria presented several challenges in which participation in heritage tourism 
planning was worth exploring. 
 
Experimental design 
In social-dilemma experimental settings, social welfare renders its dependency on subjects’ 
decisions. Economic experiments feature tasks with monetary payments in order to establish 
a direct link between desired and decided choices while ensuring internal validity (Zizzo, 
2010). Similar to other economic experiments, we employed a voluntary contributions 
mechanism, where participants were provided with an endowment and undertook a simple 
allocation task between two accounts; one for public good contributions and one for private 
provisions (Arifovic & Ledyard, 2012; Brandts & Fatas, 2012). Monetary units allocated to the 
private account were secured but fixed (i.e. no additional returns), whereas endowments spent 
on the public good were expected to create collective benefits. The voluntary contributions 
mechanism is a standard tool for exploring intrinsic incentives determined by subjects’ beliefs, 
interests and feelings to act against ‘rational’ profit maximisation (Brandts & Schram, 2008; 
van Winden et al., 2008).  
 
Subjects and treatments 
Commonly to other laboratory studies which employ voluntary contributions in public good 
games (e.g. Andreoni & Gee, 2012; Nikiforakis et al., 2012), we organised our subjects into 
small groups that normally consisted of 4 individuals. The experiment involved the running of 
four treatments with a between-subjects design, exposing each subject (and group) to a single 
treatment. Treatments 1 and 2 (thenceforth T1, T2, respectively) aimed primarily to validate 
our methodology with respect to the incentive compatible mechanism, whereas treatments 3 
and 4 (thenceforth T3, T4, respectively) were used to test participatory against non-
participatory decision-making. All treatments were applied to six groups, providing a set of 24 
observations.  
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More specifically, given that this methodological technique was employed in participatory 
tourism studies for the first time, we considered purposeful to test whether monetary incentives 
altered subjects’ behaviour. To do so, we employed T1 and T2, where groups comprising local 
citizens were exposed to either hypothetical pay-offs (T1) or incentive-compatible monetary 
endowments (T2). By comparing data generated when hypothetical and real rewards were 
effective, we established that the voluntary contributions mechanism was a valid 
methodological tool given that incentive-compatible endowments altered subjects’ behaviour 
considerably (i.e. deliberation and conflict were significantly higher in groups with actual 
monetary payments). For brevity, we do not report these results here but are available upon 
request. 
Furthermore, treatments T3 and T4 were both incentive-compatible but differed in their 
composition of stakeholders. More specifically, T3 groups consisted exclusively of state-
appointed heritage experts working locally and/or representatives from the local municipal and 
regional governments. We refer to these groups as ‘non-participatory’ given that they reflect 
conventional top-down structures of decision-making for heritage tourism. In contrast, T4 
groups comprised a mix (normally a 2+2 combination) of government agents (as in T3) and 
citizens with no previous authority or direct power to influence heritage tourism planning (as 
in T2). We define T4 groups as ‘participatory’ given that their composition reflects a pluralist 
community-inclusive structure for heritage tourism planning.  
Given the results of T1 and T2 groups, T1 data was excluded from remaining analysis (for 
consistency, as hypothetical pay-offs affected behaviour significantly), whereas T2 data were 
further used to explore citizen-led or ‘grass-roots’ governance in heritage tourism investment 
decisions, where local residents and entrepreneurs acted autonomously. Hence, our analysis 
draws from three types of groups-treatments; namely, grass-roots/citizens (T2), expert-
led/non-participatory (T3), and mixed/participatory (T4). 
To collect behavioural data and observe participants’ interactions in a real setting, we ran 
a series of seven sessions at Kastoria between September and November 2015, which 
accommodated a total of 96 human subjects. Apart from controlling group composition based 
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on participants’ capacity, the recruitment of subjects and their allocation to treatment groups 
remained random. Our call for participants was publicly advertised in mainstream local and 
social media and was open to everyone living or working in the area (convenience/random 
sampling). Invitations were also disseminated to relevant government bodies and their 
representatives (quota sampling) and followed by phone or email correspondence to confirm 
attendance. Although these sampling techniques are susceptible to biases, in our case, a 
‘biased’ self-selected sample was considered more realistic, as those interested in local 
heritage tourism were those who would volunteer to a real participatory initiative. Especially 
for policy testing, it is common for experimenters to recruit participants with relevant 
experience or biases as it contributes to external validity (Dyer & Kagel, 1996). 
 
Scenarios and procedure 
In consultation with the local branch of the Archaeological Service, we designed two realistic 
project scenarios. Scenario 1 proposed the development of digital heritage trails across the 
area, whereas Scenario 2 prescribed the development of a public engagement programme at 
the local state archaeological museum. Both scenarios were viewed as effective and 
affordable tools for promoting local heritage to visitors and interest groups. Our rationale 
behind using two scenarios was that heritage tourism decisions can be influenced by 
investment-specific goals or by how a particular course of action might satisfy subjects’ beliefs 
(Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010). For this reason, investment scenarios carried two distinct 
characteristics. Firstly, Scenario 1 combined a series of heritage sites at various locations 
whereas Scenario 2 focused on a single site at a particular location, to expose any spatial 
rivalries. Secondly, the heritage trails scenario was more tourism-oriented whereas the 
museum project emphasised education and identity values, to expose any clashing interests 
between different parties. We hold that observing behaviour in two different decision-making 
contexts enhances the robustness of our results as real-world heritage tourism planning 
involves decision-making on multiple matters. Overall, we draw our conclusions based on 
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aggregate data (i.e. behaviour as expressed in both scenarios) although we also analyse the 
performance of groups as per treatment by distinguishing between the two scenarios.  
Based on our protocol, all sessions followed the same procedure where subjects were 
firstly assigned to a group and asked to complete an attitudinal questionnaire survey 
individually. The questionnaire aimed to provide us with some quantitative data of subjects’ 
attitudinal and demographic profile. It comprised three sections of 5-point likert-style 
statements asking subjects about (i) their feelings for local heritage, government agents and 
community, (ii) their viewpoints of the legitimacy of various stakeholders to participate in 
heritage tourism planning, and (iii) their incentives to participate in heritage tourism planning. 
Demographic information included gender, age, location, education, occupation, and 
membership to community associations.  
Once questionnaires were completed, each group was allocated to an endowment of 200 
tokens and presented with the first scenario. Participants were then requested to decide 
collectively within their group how they wished to invest their endowment. The exact same 
process was followed for the second scenario after the allocation of an equal-value 
endowment. According to our experimental design, investments were made through a 
heritage/private-fund mechanism. In both scenarios, all tokens allocated to the heritage fund 
were in essence invested in the proposed project whereas tokens allocated to the private fund 
were equally shared amongst participants. Given that economic experiments avoid deception 
(Murnighan, 2015), the Archaeological Service was committed to undertake the projects’ 
implementation, if financed by participants. In this way, a formal institution was employed to 
safeguard that pro-heritage decisions could lead to actual outcomes and provided the 
experiment with external validity (Croson, 2002).  
As in public good experiments, the individually optimal choice was contributing zero sums 
to the heritage account whereas the heritage/social optimal was contributing full sums. Based 
on the latter, higher contributions to the heritage fund reflected pro-heritage cooperative 
behaviour, as tokens invested in the heritage project reduced the personal gains of decision-
makers. These gains translated into real monetary rewards for all T2, T3 and T4 groups. In 
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contrast, higher contributions to the private fund expressed non-cooperative behaviour given 
that groups preferred to use their resources on own purposes. Decisions could range from 
social optimum (i.e. full amount to heritage fund) to individual optimum (i.e. full amount to 
private fund), with any in-between combinations possible. In sessions that featured treatments 
with real monetary incentives (T2, T3, T4), a lottery system was applied, where once all groups 
had finalised their decisions, one of them was randomly selected and real payments were 
made privately (at a 1:1 token-euro exchange rate). This random selection process was 
employed because it allowed all decisions to maintain equal chances of becoming effective, 
thus still eliciting subjects’ true behaviour, while economising study costs (Garcia-Gallego et 
al., 2011; Georgantzis & Navarro-Martinez, 2010).  
Throughout the session only intra-group interaction was allowed whereas contributions 
were noted on paper and not revealed to other groups. No time limit was imposed on groups 
for finalising their decisions. Rather, deliberation time, measured as the number of minutes 
passed for reaching a collective decision, was recorded and used as an indicator of group 
performance. This indicator was inspired by previous experimental studies that use time as a 
proxy to decision-making procedures (Rubinstein, 2007; 2014). The content of group 
discussions was also recorded with the view to gain a more complete picture of intra-group 
negotiations and inform the interpretation of quantitative data (Bosman et al., 2006; Kocher & 
Shutter, 2007). Recordings were particularly useful in the study of conflict as they were 
employed to extract the personal preferences of group members as expressed during 
deliberation (i.e. individually desired contributions as opposed to collective actual 
contributions) and quantify conflict. Our first conflict variable (Conflict1) was estimated as the 
difference between the average individual/desired contributions and the collective/actual 
decisions, reflecting what behaviour prevailed (i.e. co-operative/non-cooperative). The second 
variable (Conflict2) equalled the standard deviation of individual decisions, quantifying the 
level of intra-group disagreement. Furthermore, qualitative information provided by recorded 
discussions helped us analyse negotiation dynamics when conflict arose. 
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Questionnaire data  
Although traditional economic theory oversimplifies individuals’ behaviour as one purely 
dictated by self-interest, there are admittedly other motives that drive economic choices. 
Indeed, there is vast experimental work, which illustrates that when faced with economic 
decisions, subjects frequently exhibit social preferences by choosing options that do not 
maximize their own monetary payoffs (Brandts & Fatas, 2012). Given that in our case social 
preferences translated into contributions to the heritage fund, it was worth exploring whether 
there were specific drivers related to subjects’ profile or ideological background that influenced 
individual preferences. Most importantly, based on H3, we were interested in investigating 
whether intra-group heterogeneity across subjects’ beliefs affected collective decisions. 
Towards this end, we combined questionnaire data with experimental results and 
performed a regression analysis, where individual contributions to heritage were set as the 
dependent variable and questionnaire items were used as predictors of subjects’ behaviour 
during the experiment (Table 1).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The regression model is shown in Equation 1: 
 𝐼𝐶# = 𝑎 + 𝛽(𝑺𝑬𝑵# + 𝛾(𝑳𝑬𝑮# + 𝛿(𝑴𝑶𝑻# + 𝜁(𝑫𝑬𝑴# + 𝑒#, (1) 
 
where, 𝐼𝐶# denotes the individual contributions of subject 𝑗 to the heritage fund, 𝑺𝑬𝑵#, 𝑳𝑬𝑮#, 𝑴𝑶𝑻# and 𝑫𝑬𝑴# are the vectors of the attitudinal (sentimental, legitimacy, motivational) and 
demographic characteristics of subject 𝑗 and 𝛽(, 𝛾(, 𝛿( and 𝜁( are coefficients to be estimated. 
Finally, 𝑒# denotes the error term. 
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Next, similar to Miner (1984) and Pelled (1996) who examine group behaviour based on 
individuals’ traits, we measured intra-group dissimilarity of the above factors by averaging the 
summed absolute differences among all subjects of a group, as shown in Equation 2. 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠_𝑐= = 	 1𝑛 𝑐# − 𝑐BC#DE , 𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, (2) 
where,  𝐷𝑖𝑠_𝑐= denotes the dissimilarity score of characteristic 𝑐 and group 𝑔 and 𝑐# is the 
value of the individual characteristic of subject 𝑗 and 𝑐B is the value of the same characteristic 
for every other subject of the same group.  
Again, we performed a regression analysis, where intra-group dissimilarity variables were 
set as predictors of collective contributions (Equation 3):  
 𝐺𝐶= = 𝑐 + 𝜃(𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑺𝑬𝑵= + 𝜑(𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑳𝑬𝑮= + 𝜔(𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑴𝑶𝑻= + 𝜉(𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑫𝑬𝑴= + 𝑒=, (3) 
 
where, 𝐺𝐶= denotes the collective contributions of group 𝑔 to the heritage fund and 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑺𝑬𝑵=, 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑳𝑬𝑮=, 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑴𝑶𝑻= and 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑫𝑬𝑴= are the vectors of the dissimilarity scores for each of the 
sentimental, legitimacy, motivational and demographic elements of group 𝑔,  𝜃(, 𝜑(, 𝜔( and 𝜉( 
are coefficients to be estimated and 𝑒= denotes the error term. 
 
Results 
Group synthesis and behaviour 
Table 2 provides a general overview of group characteristics along with the mean values of 
contributions to the heritage fund, deliberation times to reach decisions, and intra-group 
conflict across treatments. Our preliminary results suggest that in Scenario 1, T3 (non-
participatory) and T4 (participatory) groups exhibited similar pro-heritage behaviour whereas 
in Scenario 2, T4 groups were slightly more generous. In contrast, T2 (citizen) groups invested 
less in both heritage projects compared to other treatment groups. Furthermore, average 
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minutes spent to reach a collective decision and conflict values were generally higher in T2 
and T4 treatments as opposed to T3 groups. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
A series of non-parametric (Mann Whitney) tests allowed us to examine behaviour based 
on group composition in greater detail (see Table 3). Our results demonstrate that 
contributions to heritage did not in fact exhibit any significant differences between T3 and T4 
(i.e. non-participatory and participatory groups), whereas significantly lower contributions were 
evident for T2 (citizen) groups in the first scenario. The latter suggests that citizens exhibited 
a less co-operative behaviour when acted autonomously, compared to citizens that 
collaborated with government agents to reach decisions jointly. However, in the second 
scenario similar differences were not observed (i.e. citizen groups were statistically equally 
co-operative to other groups). In short, our findings do not lend support to H1 as participatory 
groups made equal pro-heritage investment choices to non-participatory groups. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Turning our focus on deliberation and conflict, we find that T3 and T4 groups exhibited no 
statistically significant differences in terms of time, whereas, T4 groups showed a higher 
tendency to discord (the significance of Conflict1 was at p=0.056 for both scenarios whereas 
Conflict2 was significant with p=0.092 in Scenario 1). Thus, although government officials 
often claim time inefficiencies as barriers to broader community involvement (Marzuki et al., 
2012; Izdiak et al., 2015), it appears that participation does not inherently lead to longer 
decision-making times compared to counterfactuals. However, pluralist structures of 
governance were indeed more susceptible to conflict and the expression of divergent policy 
preferences as opposed to less inclusive decision-making.  
		
21	
Similarly, the comparison between T2 and T3 groups illuminates significant differences 
across deliberation times and conflict, with citizen groups presenting higher deliberation times 
and higher level of disagreement. In addition, differences between groups that commonly 
consists of citizens, either exclusively (T2) or partially (T4) are mainly insignificant (apart from 
higher contributions to Scenario 1 on behalf of T4 groups). This is somewhat anticipated as 
the majority of participants in these groups (i.e. citizens) had not been exposed to collaborative 
planning prior to the experiment and had less experience in handling policy issues as 
compared to traditional power-holders. These results confirm H2 partly, given that we do not 
report differences in time efficiency between the two decision-making arrangements whereas 
conflict seems to be higher in participatory groups compared to conventional power structures. 
However, interestingly, despite higher dispute, we observe that opposing viewpoints did 
not push participatory groups towards non-cooperative behaviour. We thus witness that 
pluralist community-inclusive decision-making were indeed more prone to conflict compared 
to traditional planning, but this did not translate into lower contributions to heritage. Hence, 
although participation does not eliminate the inherent disagreement in policy preferences, it 
builds on cooperative capacity towards consensual outcomes (Lo et al., 2013). This provides 
an indication that contrary to previous discourses (Byrd et al., 2009; Marzuki et al. 2012), 
conflict in participatory settings, where all parties share equal power, may act constructively 
rather than destructively.   
Overall, these findings provide some new evidence that pro-heritage decisions are not a 
privilege of government/expert administration. Participatory groups comprising traditional 
power-holders and local citizens made equal contributions towards a commonly beneficial 
heritage tourism project, as did groups consisting merely of power-holders. Thus, 
communication between experts and community worked in favour of pro-heritage decisions, 
implying that social interaction in participatory contexts can activate people’s altruism 
(Andreoni & Rao, 2011). This suggests that citizen input when balanced with expert 
knowledge and formal governance can create a fertile ground for fruitful outcomes. However, 
grass-roots decision-making structures based merely on citizens may be comparatively 
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weaker in prioritising heritage tourism investments in destinations with no prior civic agency 
over policy matters.  
Given our observations, it is valuable to further disentangle conflict to explore its impact on 
decision-making. Table 4 deconstructs Conflict1 as presented in Table 3 and compares the 
average individual (desired) contributions against final collective (actual) decisions.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As suspected, in their vast majority, conflicting preferences regarding heritage tourism 
investments served against participants’ own interests, as collective contributions were higher 
than average individually-desired choices. This holds for participatory (T4) and grass-roots 
(T2) groups, suggesting that community-inclusive governance could avoid serving personal 
interests and rather work towards communal outcomes (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). For 
instance, in Scenario 1, we notice that arising conflict in participatory groups led them to 
increase their contributions at a level very close to the social optimal. These results witness 
the dominance of social rationality in participatory governance, as provisions for heritage were 
prioritised over personal benefits (Vatn, 2009).  
We extend this analysis by investigating the correlations between contributions, 
deliberation and conflict, using the Spearman correlation test (see Table 5). We do so in order 
to provide further evidence on how decision-making time and conflict related to policy 
outcomes.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We observe that contrary to government-led (T3) groups, where both time-contributions 
and time-conflict were negatively correlated, in citizen (T2) and participatory (T4) groups 
longer deliberation increased investments to the heritage fund. The negative correlation 
between time and conflict in T3 decision-making is somewhat unanticipated and may indicate 
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internal power imbalances among state representatives. In contrast, dispute extended 
discussion length in T2 and T4 groups, indicating a greater level of negotiating capacity 
compared to T3 despite the deceleration of final choices. Most importantly, the positive 
correlation of time and contributions in groups with citizen representation (both T2, T4) 
indicates that more time-consuming decision-making, which is generally regarded as 
expensive and unpleasant (Izdiak et al., 2015; Marzuki et al. 2012), can be rewarding in terms 
of trading in effectiveness for consensual pro-heritage policies. In addition, the positive 
correlation between contributions and conflict across all treatments re-affirms our earlier 
finding of the prevalence of pro-heritage preferences in conflictual situations, illustrating 
dispute’s constructive capacity.  
Interestingly, previous experiments on individuals had associated lengthy decision times 
with pro-social choices, suggesting that decision-making involves a clash between one’s 
personal and altruistic interests (Rubinstein, 2007). Yet, there is no experimental evidence on 
how conflict plays in a collaborative context or what occurs when some participants attempt 
to promote their own ends. To explore conflict negotiations, we employed recordings data of 
group discussions. Based on Rahim (2001) and Thomas (1992), we identified four negotiating 
approaches to conflict; (i) the contending approach, where subjects showed interest primarily 
for their own ends, (ii) the accommodating approach, where subjects were mostly concerned 
for communal benefits, (iii) the collaborative approach, where preferences were balanced 
between own and collective needs and (iv) the avoiding approach where subjects’ concerns 
were equally low for both sides. Qualitative results are presented in Table 6.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In general, we observe that when collaborative behaviour prevailed, conflict resolution 
leaned towards pro-heritage decisions (e.g. T2G2, T4G6 on Scenario 1 and T2G1, T4G5 on 
Scenario 2). By contrast, when contending voices formed a majority, group contributions to 
the heritage fund were pushed down (e.g. T2G4, T3G1 in Scenario 2). Nevertheless, such 
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negotiation dynamics were observed merely in citizen (T2) and government-led (T3) groups. 
Rather, contending behaviour was expressed only by group minorities in participatory (T4) 
groups (either by power-holders or citizens), and pro-social preferences maintained their 
resilience. This suggests that in our experiment, participatory decision-making was rather 
resistant to favouring individual ends that antagonised collective benefits. Moreover, as 
conflict originated by both government agents and citizens alike, participatory decision-making 
was successful in balancing power between different stakeholders in favour of commonly 
beneficial choices.	It is also worth noting that our recordings (although not shown here due to 
data sensitivity issues) illuminated occasions where refusal to co-operate expressed what 
Lowenthal (2015) defines as a clash between the benefits of the past (heritage) and the 
benefits of the present (socio-economic) as the safeguarding and promotion of cultural 
heritage was not prioritised by subjects’ personal agendas. In addition, institutional distrust 
was also a common source of non-cooperation, especially in groups with no institutional 
representation (i.e. T2).  
 
Subjects’ idiosyncrasy and intra-group heterogeneity effects 
We continue our analysis to investigate how group heterogeneity, as captured by the 
dissimilarity scores of Equation (2), impacted on collective decisions (see Equation 3). 
Although we are mostly interested in examining how dissimilarities among group members 
affected group contributions, we begin by briefly examining the drivers of individual 
preferences, given that recordings data unmasked some interesting information. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Based on Table 7, we observe that individual contributions, both in the full (IC) and in the 
citizen sample (ICC) estimation, were primarily influenced by feelings of trust and perceptions 
of legitimacy. In the full sample, community trust exerted a significant positive effect, as the 
higher the subject’s trust in the local community, the higher their social preferences. 
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Interestingly, in the citizen sample that excluded state officials, community trust was converted 
into institutional trust as a driver that increased co-operative behaviour. Trust is considered a 
fundamental element of social exchange and one that promotes decisions for society’s best 
interest (Nunkoo & Ramkissoon, 2011; Nunkoo & Gursoy, 2016). Likewise, legitimacy factors 
were particularly influential in subjects’ choices. Particularly the credibility of the 
Archaeological Service affected contributions significantly positively. This is reasonable given 
that by experimental design, the Archaeological Service would lead the implementation of the 
proposed projects-scenarios. As Ostrom (1990) observes, collective decisions are 
considerably affected by participants’ judgements of effectiveness regarding the 
administrative apparatus that is expected to undertake the application of approved policies. A 
reverse effect is observed for factors concerning the credibility of central governance and 
heritage freelancers, illuminating the competing roles of different parties (central/local, 
public/private) and subjects’ acknowledgement of their legitimacy. 
In terms of intra-group heterogeneity of opinions and its influence on collective decisions, 
Table 8 illustrates that similarly to individual preferences group contributions (GC) were also 
significantly impacted by intuitive divergence of stakeholders’ legitimacy. These results are in 
line with Lo et al. (2013), who demonstrate that collective policy choices are heavily influenced 
by perceptions of trust and shared agreement over institutional reliability. Moreover, our 
experimental evidence lends support to Nunkoo (2015), Nunkoo and Gursoy (2016), and 
Nunkoo and Ramkissoon (2012), who find strong relationships between power, confidence in 
institutions and support for tourism policies. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In particular, dissimilarity of participants’ views with regards to the credibility of the central 
and municipal government, tour operators, heritage freelancers and community associations 
in local tourism planning acted favourably for heritage investments. This contrasts with 
dissimilarity of trust towards the Archaeological Service, consultants and tourism 
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professionals, which played a negative role on collective choices as also did dissimilarity of 
subjects’ engagement with community associations. Comparing these results, with the drivers 
of individual contributions, we conclude that in groups which exhibited high trust dissimilarity, 
collective decisions were mostly shaped by distrust. For example, those who supported a 
central administration of heritage tourism issues, were less willing to allocate resources to a 
locally managed initiative (see Table 6). However, when they deliberated with group members 
that had little trust to central government, the end result was higher contributions to the locally 
managed fund, suggesting that distrust eventually prevailed.   
In addition, it is instructive to identify in which treatments were these dissimilarities more 
evident. Table 9 focuses on the variables that influenced groups contributions (GC) 
significantly, showing average dissimilarity scores across treatments. In seven of these 
variables, where the coefficient is positive, the treatment group with the highest average 
dissimilarity score is preferred, as higher dissimilarity favours contributions to heritage. By 
contrast in the four variables that have negative coefficients, the opposite is favoured.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Interestingly, we observe that participatory groups (T4) present the largest number of 
preferred dissimilarity scores. This especially holds for the variables that had a negative 
coefficient (i.e. heterogeneity of opinions with regards to the credibility of the Archaeological 
Service and the role of external consultants, along with profile divergence of association 
membership was lower in these groups). These scores also illuminate that heterogeneity is 
not inherent to participatory groups as ostensibly more ‘uniform’ groups (citizen-only, 
government-only) may exhibit higher ideological disparity in key matters.  
Overall, the findings of Tables 7-9 suggest that our third hypothesis (H3) can be partially 
accepted, firstly because heterogeneity within a collaborative setting does not necessarily 
exert negative influences on investment decisions and secondly because participatory groups 
are not inherently more heterogeneous. The former is interesting as in the literature, 
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divergence of opinions between stakeholders is viewed as a factor that increases problems 
and complexity (Byrd et al. 2009; Jordan et al. 2013; Waligo et al., 2013). Yet, we find that 
participatory planning can provide a fertile ground for negotiating in favour of communal 
heritage benefits. Furthermore, the fact that participatory multi-stakeholder groups were not 
intrinsically more ideologically heterogeneous than groups consisting exclusively of either 
government or citizen representatives illustrates that supposedly homogeneous social actors 
should not be treated as uniform entities. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Assigning decision power to citizens and the broader public is subject to social dilemmas and 
the risk of sacrificing time and monetary resources to a process that fails to pay-off. 
Nevertheless, the implications of involving communities in policy decisions had never been 
directly compared to the implications of not involving them. In addition, ex-ante assessments 
of participatory approaches had not been previously employed as a means to inform the 
instigation of community-based planning.  
Thus, a key contribution of this study is the direct comparison between different decision-
making structures in a destination with no prior experience of pluralist policy-making. Exploring 
how well the generally accepted discourse of community participation resonates with the 
reality on the ground is important for emerging destinations where citizen intervention is 
entirely new and where tourism benefits and costs are not highly observable. A comparative 
exploration of how cooperation for the provision of heritage goods plays in action can be 
valuable in terms of shedding more light on the appropriateness and specificities of public 
involvement at the higher rungs of Arnstein’s (1969) ladder, informing the design of 
participatory endeavours in a given destination. More importantly, the use of experimental 
methodologies can help us overcome the barrier of limited natural data and fill-in current gaps 
through more systematic research on the subject, exploring the drivers of collaboration and 
other dynamics that influence people’s attitudes. 
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The social interaction space staged during our experiment exposed subjects to investment 
decisions concerning local heritage tourism development. The formulation of government-led, 
grass-roots and participatory (mixed) groups allowed us to observe, for the first time, their 
behavioural similarities and differences with emphasis on collective choices, deliberation, 
conflict, negotiation and heterogeneity. Our results provide an indication that direct 
comparisons between these decision-making arrangements could challenge common beliefs 
related to citizen involvement, such as significantly more lengthy processes, destructive 
conflict and intrinsic heterogeneity of perceptions. Our first hypothesis that participatory 
decision-making leads to lower pro-heritage investments compared to non-participatory 
processes is rejected as community-inclusive and government-led groups made equally high 
heritage provisions. Our second hypothesis that participatory decision-making is more time-
consuming and more prone to conflict can be accepted only partly. Deliberation across groups 
of participatory and non-participatory compositions did not differ significantly but participatory 
multi-stakeholder groups were more susceptible to disagreement. However interestingly, time 
to reach decisions and the amount of contributions to the heritage fund were positively 
correlated for participatory groups and negatively correlated for non-participatory groups. 
Furthermore, conflict was positively correlated with contributions across all treatments. 
Moreover, our third hypothesis that group heterogeneity may affect final decisions negatively 
is also partly accepted, given that there were beliefs that affected choices both negatively and 
positively. Notably, subjects’ social preferences were heavily impacted by their felt trust and 
credibility judgements concerning stakeholders. In collective settings where such judgements 
lacked consistency, feelings of distrust eventually prevailed. 
Overall, our experimental findings suggest that deliberation and conflict do not necessarily 
indicate vulnerability or a need to trade in efficiency for inclusiveness, but rather a way towards 
a compromise that can serve heritage and communal gains. This fits well with the essence of 
democratic planning as improved and commonly beneficial policymaking (Aas et al., 2005; 
Saufi et al., 2014; Wray, 2011). Therefore, participatory design should seek to accommodate 
deliberation and participants’ reflection upon planning choices. In addition, the dramatic 
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influence of trust and credibility on mobilizing social preferences suggests that commitment to 
sustainability goals can be pursued by investing in effective communication, the cultivation of 
good relationships amongst participants, and the promotion of accountability and reciprocity. 
Moreover, conflict, although may act constructively at initial stages, it can still become 
detrimental in the long-run if participants’ collaborative and accommodating intentions are not 
sustained. Building on stakeholders’ interdependence and promoting co-operation as the only 
avenue for realizing participants’ goals might be crucial for the prevalence of social rationality. 
This study is limited by being place and time-specific, whereas its focus on decision-making 
provides evidence on a single aspect of a multi-stage and multi-faceted planning process. 
Future research could employ experimental methodologies to examine community 
involvement in other destinations, study different participatory stages, or explore other 
dimensions of collective behaviour, such as the levels of democracy, deliberation mechanisms 
and issues of power within collaborative settings. The experimental methodology applied here 
introduces an important line of research to participatory tourism studies, which along with other 
empirical research could be particularly useful for extending our knowledge of the complex 
issue of community involvement within the context of sustainable tourism strategies. Another 
interesting avenue for further investigation would be the comparison of ex-ante experimental 
decision-making with ex-post actual planning procedures at a single destination to formalise 
how experimental evidence translates into practice. 
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Table 1. List of variables 
Name Description Measurement 
Individual Contributions 
(IC) 
Pursued/desired contribution to the 
heritage fund 
Experimental 
Units (0-400) 
Sentiment Factors (SEN) 
Attachment to heritage Sentimental attachment to local heritage 
Ratings from 1-5 
where 1 
expresses lowest 
and 5  
highest  
agreement 
Responsibility to protect 
heritage Personal feelings of heritage stewardship  
Institutional Trust Trust in local authorities for handling heritage tourism issues 
Community Trust Trust in citizen partnerships for delivering communal gains 
Heritage as priority issue Belief that heritage protection-management should be policy priority 
WTP1  Willingness to pay for heritage through taxes 
WTP2 Willingness to pay for heritage through personal income 
Legitimacy factors (LEG) 
Central government 
Acknowledging the legitimacy and 
credibility of each of these stakeholders 
to participate in local heritage tourism 
planning 
Ratings from 1-5 
where 1 
expresses lowest 
and 5  
highest 
acceptance 
Regional government 
City councils 
Archaeological Service 
Consultants-specialists 
Tour operators 
Heritage freelancers 
Tourism professionals 
Community associations 
Local residents 
Motivational factors (MOT) 
Monetary gains Opportunities to increase personal profits as driver to participate 
Ratings from 1-5 
where 1 
expresses lowest 
and 5  
highest  
influence 
Professional development Opportunities to develop professional skills/experience as driver to participate 
Not time-demanding Investing relatively little time as driver to participate 
Receiving special training Training as driver to participate 
True collaborative spirit Collaborative behaviour of all parties involved as driver to participate 
Demographic factors (DEM) 
Gender Males; Females  Dummy 0 (Male), 1 (Female) 
Age 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+ Scores from 1  (18-24) to 6 (65+) 
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Location Most to least central locations of heritage tourism interest  
Scores from 1 
(highest) to 3 
(lowest) proximity 
Education High school diploma or lower; university graduate degree, post-graduate degree 
Scores from  
1 (lowest)  
to 3 (highest) 
Relevant Occupation Profession relevant to heritage and/or tourism 
Dummy 0 (No), 
1 (Yes) 
Formal community 
involvement  
Membership to local community 
associations 
Dummy 0 (No), 
1 (Yes) 
Note: IC were elicited from experimental deliberation (recordings data). All other values were based 
on questionnaire data. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of group syntheses and collected data. 
  Treatment 
  T2 T3 T4 
Groups (N) 6 6 6 
Subjects (N) 24 20 28 
Real endowments Yes Yes Yes 
Avg. officials per group (%) 0.00 1.00 0.45 
Avg. Males per group (%) 0.63 0.33 0.41 
Age1 (median) 3.0 3.0 4.0 
Education2 (median) 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Location3 (median) 1.0 2.0 1.0 
Avg. Contributions (ExU)     
Sc1 141.67 200.00 191.67 
Sc2 125.00 125.00 176.67 
Avg. Time (Mins)      
Sc1 20.00 8.67 13.83 
Sc2 11.17 7.00 10.33 
Avg. Conflict14     
Sc1 16.67 0.00 20.00 
Sc2 2.08 -11.11 13.33 
Avg. Conflict25     
Sc1 40.14 0.00 44.72 
Sc2 12.5 19.25 44.72 
Notes:  
1: Age is coded as 1:18-24, 2:25-34, 3:35-44, 4:45-54, 5:55-64,6:65-74.  
2: Education is coded as 1: High school graduate, 2: University graduate, 3: Post-
graduate. 
3: Location is coded 1-3 starting from Kastoria’s city core and moving towards peripheral 
areas. 
4: Conflict1 is estimated as the difference between individual desired contributions 
(mean values) and group actual contributions. 
5: Conflict2 is the standard deviation of individual desired contributions of group 
members. 
ExU: Experimental Units; Sc1: Scenario 1; Sc2: Scenario 2; Mins: Minutes 
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Table 3. Inter-treatment comparisons for scenarios 1, 2 and total. 
Panel A: Scenarios 1 and 2 
Treatment Contributions Time Conflict1 Conflict2 
 Sc1 Sc2 Sc1 Sc2 Sc1 Sc2 Sc1 Sc2 
 T2vsT3 -2.309** -0.252 -2.531** -1.615 -1.897* -0.631 -2.292** -0.420 
T3vsT4 -1.000 -1.378 -1.470 -0.890 -1.915* -1.687* -1.915* -0.866 
T2vsT4 -1.896* -0.895 -0.723 -0.563 -0.259 -1.146 0.000 -1.081 
Panel B: Total  
Treatment Tot_Contributions Tot_Time Tot_Conflict1 Tot_Conflict2 
 T2vsT3 -0.574         -2.096** -2.326**         -1.250 
T3vsT4 -1.199         -1.549          -2.006*         -1.614 
T2vsT4 -1.459         -0.722          -0.333         -0.982 
Notes: Values represent z-statistic of the Mann-Whitney test. 
Conflict1 is estimated as the difference between individual desired contributions (mean values) and group 
actual contributions. 
Conflict2 is the standard deviation of individual desired contributions of group members. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Individual/group contributions per group 
 Scenario 1 	 Scenario 2               Total 
 IC GC 	 IC GC  IC    GC 
T2 
150.00 150.00  175.00 200.00  325.00 350.00 
175.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  375.00 400.00 
150.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  350.00 400.00 
75.00 100.00  162.50 150.00  237.50 250.00 
100.00 100.00  0.00 0.00  100.00 100.00 
100.00 100.00  0.00 0.00  100.00 100.00 
T2 Mean 125.00 141.67  122.92 125.00  247.92 266.67 
T3 
200.00 200.00  66.67 0.00  266.67 200.00 
200.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  400.00 400.00 
200.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  400.00 400.00 
200.00 200.00  100.00 100.00  300.00 300.00 
200.00 200.00  150.00 150.00  350.00 350.00 
200.00 200.00  100.00 100.00  300.00 300.00 
T3 Mean 200.00 200.00  136.11 125.00  336.11 325.00 
T4 
160.00 200.00  160.00 200.00  320.00 400.00 
150.00 150.00  100.00 100.00  250.00 250.00 
160.00 200.00  160.00 200.00  320.00 400.00 
200.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  400.00 400.00 
200.00 200.00  160.00 160.00  360.00 360.00 
160.00 200.00  200.00 200.00  360.00 400.00 
T4 Mean 171.67 191.67  163.33 176.67  335.00   368.33 
Notes: Values reflect experimental units. 
IC: Individual (desired) contributions (mean).  
GC: Group (actual) contributions.  
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Table 5. Correlations between total contributions, time and conflict (Spearman's rho) 
 Tot_Contributions Tot_Time Tot_Conflict1 Tot_Conflict2 
 T2 Groups 
Tot_Contributions 1.000    
Tot_Time 0.471 1.000   
Tot_Conflict1 0.955 0.441 1.000  
Tot_Conflict2 0.746 0.406 0.896 1.000 
 T3 Groups 
Tot_Contributions 1.000    
Tot_Time -0.750 1.000   
Tot_Conflict1 0.674 -0.696 1.000  
Tot_Conflict2 0.696 -0.674 -1.000 1.000 
 T4 Groups 
Tot_Contributions 1.000    
Tot_Time 0.439 1.000   
Tot_Conflict1 0.657 0.926 1.000  
Tot_Conflict2 0.495 0.956 0.904 1.000 
Notes:  
Tot_Conflict1 is estimated as the difference between individual desired contributions (mean values) and 
group actual contributions. 
Tot_Conflict2 is the standard deviation of individual desired contributions of group members. 
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Table 6. Negotiating behaviour towards conflict 
Treatment Main source 
(as expressed) 
Majority behaviour  
(Minority behaviour) 
IC GC 
Scenario 1 
T2 Institutional trust Collaborative (Accommodating) 150.00 150.00 
T2 Institutional trust Collaborative (Collaborative) 175.00 200.00 
T2 Project quality Collaborative (Accommodating) 150.00 200.00 
T2 Local rivalry Collaborative (Contending) 75.00 100.00 
T4 Personal agendas Collaborative (Contending) 160.00 200.00 
T4 Project quality Collaborative (Accommodating) 160.00 200.00 
T4 Power clash Avoidance (Contending) 160.00 200.00 
Scenario 2 
T2 Institutional trust Collaborative (Contending) 175.00 200.00 
T2 Personal agendas Contending (Collaborative) 162.50 150.00 
T3 Personal agendas Contending (Accommodating) 66.67 0.00 
T4 Power clash Avoidance (Contending) 160.00 200.00 
T4 Personal agendas Collaborative (Contending) 160.00 200.00 
T4 Power clash Collaborative (Contending) 160.00 160.00 
Notes: Source of conflict and behaviour are based on the recordings of group deliberation. 
IC: Individual (desired) contributions to heritage (mean) 
GC: Group (actual) contributions to heritage 
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Table 7. Factors driving individual (desired) contributions. This table 
presents the results of Equation 1 (𝐼𝐶# = 𝑎 + 𝛽(𝑺𝑬𝑵# + 𝛾(𝑳𝑬𝑮# + 𝛿(𝑴𝑶𝑻# +𝜁(𝑫𝑬𝑴# + 𝑒#) 
 Full sample Citizens only 
 IC IC 
Constant 133.367 331.849 
Sentiment factors  
Attachment to heritage 24.954 -35.477 
Responsibility to protect heritage -1.181 -20.929 
Institutional Trust 8.770 40.989** 
Community Trust 53.087** 38.335 
Heritage as priority issue 45.482** 82.956*** 
WTP1 (taxes) 37.751 66.736* 
WTP2 (income) -38.617* -56.143*** 
Legitimacy factors 
Central government -36.248* -80.378*** 
Municipal government 19.162 -18.636 
City councils -6.387 -4.512 
Local Archaeological Service 64.832** 100.753*** 
Consultants-specialists -3.432 -16.645 
Tour operators 0.551 62.152*** 
Heritage freelancers -49.410** -88.259** 
Tourism professionals 7.043 19.325 
Community associations 10.653 100.638*** 
Local residents -1.733 -30.799 
Motivational factors 
Monetary gains -7.360 -48.900*** 
Professional development -11.224 -21.074 
Not time-demanding  -0.679 -26.189 
Receiving special training -71.937** 49.018 
True collaborative spirit 28.127 -58.438** 
Demographic factors 
Gender -29.954 -81.334*** 
Age -7.838 14.493 
Location -67.392* -84.429*** 
Education 12.654 -70.809** 
Relevant Occupation -5.843 35.074 
Current involvement  -14.320 100.552** 
   
R-squared 0.458 0.796 
Notes: Estimations are based on aggregate contributions based on both scenarios.  
IC: Individual (desired) contributions to heritage. 
* , **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 8. Intra-group dissimilarity effects on collective (group) contributions. This 
table presents the results of Equation 3 (𝐺𝐶= = 𝑐 + 𝜃(𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑺𝑬𝑵= + 𝜑(𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑳𝑬𝑮= +𝜔(𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑴𝑶𝑻= + 𝜉(𝑫𝒊𝒔𝑫𝑬𝑴= + 𝑒=) 
 GC GC GC GC 
Constant 149.631 239.955*** 250.590*** 245.453** 
Sentiment factors 
Attachment to heritage 61.040    
Responsibility to protect heritage 36.892    
Institutional Trust 97.406    
Community Trust -38.645    
Heritage as priority issue 18.265    
WTP1 (taxes) -58.792    
WTP2 (personal income) 52.047    
Legitimacy factors 
Central government  103.600*   
Municipal government  143.626*   
City councils  -30.238   
Local Archaeological Service  -153.179**   
Consultants-specialists  -134.633**   
Tour operators   141.566**   
Heritage freelancers  182.573**   
Tourism professionals   -222.141***   
Community associations  131.114***   
Local residents  -55.282   
Motivational factors 
Monetary gains   -32.151  
Professional development   -10.893  
Not time-demanding    45.507  
Receiving special training   27.374  
True collaborative spirit   139.707  
Demographic Factors 
Gender    219.140** 
Age    -28.553 
Location    -133.600 
Education    26.381 
Relevant Occupation    226.024* 
Current involvement     -192.077** 
IC    -0.608 
Time    4.003 
Group dummies YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.554 0.907 0.312 0.623 
Notes: Estimations are based on aggregate values based on both scenarios. 
GC: Group (actual) contributions to heritage. 
IC: Individual (desired) contributions to heritage. 
* , **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 9. Average dissimilarity scores for variables influencing GC 
significantly 
Dissimilarity variable T2 T3 T4 
Positive coefficients 
Central government 0.973 1.083 0.667 
Municipal government 1.307 0.517 0.623 
Tour operators 1.167 1.583 1.123 
Heritage freelancers 0.473 0.817 1.212 
Local community organisations 0.807 0.550 0.623 
Gender 0.250 0.317 0.447 
Relevant Occupation 0.167 0.513 0.000 
Negative coefficients 
Local Archaeological Service 1.028 0.500 0.335 
Consultants-specialists 0.917 1.295 0.312 
Tourism professionals 1.197 0.895 1.547 
Current involvement  0.473 0.378 0.223 
Note: Bold denotes best result. The best results for the variables with positive (negative) 
coefficients are those with the highest (lowest) average dissimilarity scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
